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T h i s  p a p e r  i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  
a n d  c r i t i c a l  c o m m e n t  a n d  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  
r e p r o d u c e d  i n  w h o l e  o r  i n  p a r t  
w i t h o u t  p r i o r  p e r m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  a u t h o r
( C ) L u c i a n o  B a r d i  
P r i n t e d  i n  I t a l y  i n  1 9 8 7  
E u r o p e a n  U n i v e r s i t y  I n s t i t u t e  
B a d i  a F i e s o l a n a  
1 - 5 0 0 1 6 S a n  D o m e n i c o  ( F i )



























































































T h e  E u r o p e a n  P o l i c y  U n i t
T h e  E u r o p e a n  P o l i c y  U n i t  a t  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
U n i v e r s i t y  I n s t i t u t e  w a s  c r e a t e d  t o  f u r t h e r  t h r e e  m a i n  
g o a l s .  F i r s t ,  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
U n i v e r s i t y  I n s t i t u t e  a s  a f o r u m  f o r  c r i t i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
k e y  i t e m s  o.n t h e  C o m m u n i t y  a g e n d a .  S e c o n d ,  t o  e n h a n c e  t h e  
d o c u m e n t a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  s c h o l a r s  o f  E u r o p e a n  a f f a i r s .  
T h i r d ,  t o  s p o n s o r  i n d i v i d u a l  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t s  o n  t o p i c s  o f  
current interest to the European Communities. Both as in- 
d e p t h  b a c k g r o u n d  s t u d i e s  a n d  a s  p o l i c y  a n a l y s e s  i n  t h e i r  own 
r i g h t ,  t h e s e  p r o j e c t s  s h o u l d  p r o v e  v a l u a b l e  t o  C o m m u n i t y  
p o l i c y - m a k i n g .
F u r t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
P o l i c y  U n i t  c a n  h e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  D i r e c t o r ,  a t  t h e  
E u r o p e a n  U n i v e r s i t y  I n s t i t u t e  i n  F l o r e n c e .
O n e  o f  t h e  m a i n  s t u m b l i n g  b l o c k s  i n  t h e
n e g o t i a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  u n i f o r m
e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  w a s  an d  
r e m a i n s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  I t  
h a s  o f t e n  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  a p r e f e r e n c e  v o t i n g  m e c h a n i s m  
s h o u l d  be  a d o p t e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  an  e x p l i c i t  l i n k  
b e t w e e n  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  a n d  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  t o  t h e  E P .  V e t  s u c h  a m e c h a n i s m  h a s  h a d  
r a t h e r  a b a d  p r e s s  i n  s o m e  M e m b e r  S t a t e s .  T o  s u p p l y  a 
c r i t i c a l  d a t u m  i n  the.  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e ,  D r .  B a r d i  c o n d u c t e d  a 
s t u d y  o f  t h e  r o l e  p r e f e r e n c e  v o t i n g  p l a y s  i n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  E m p i r i c a l  f i n d i n g s  b a s e d  on  
the data collected by several experts in the Community are 
u s e d  t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  a l l e g e d  e f f e c t s  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  v o t i n g  
a n d  t o  t e s t  i t s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w h e r e  i t  i s  





























































































Article 138, paragraph 3, of the The Treaty of Rome 
lays upon the European Parliament the obligation to:
"draw up proposals for elections by direct universal 
suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all 
member states" (emphasis added)
Although the European Parliament has been elected by 
direct universal suffrage since 1979, there is still only a 
hope that a uniform electoral procedure will be adopted for 
the 1989 election, over three decades after the signing of 
the Treaty.
The European Parliament had indeed adopted in March 
1982 a Draft Act on a uniform electoral procedure by 158 
votes to 77, with 27 abstentions (1). The Draft Act was the 
result of two and a half years of heated debates in the 
Political Affairs Committee of the Parliament. In the end, 
the desires of a majority within the Parliament (Christian 
Democrats, Liberals, Socialists) to introduce a system of 
proportional representation (PR) prevailed. A consistent 
number of MEPs, mostly from Britain, however, denounced the 




























































































Critics of national list PR argued that this procedure
would to a large extent leave all decisions concerning MEP
recruitment to the party apparatuses. By thus short
circuiting the direct relationship between electors and
their MEPs, it was feared that use of national lists would 
inhibit mobilisation of the electorate, a frightening 
prospect given the very low turnout in European elections, 
and nullify the principle of individual accountability. As a 
response to these criticisms, the Draft Act provided for the 
creation of regional constituencies and the option of an 
intra-party preference vote (2). Voters would be allowed to 
cast votes for individual candidates listed on the party 
slate, with the preferences they expressed determining which 
candidates eventually would be elected.
Shortly after the adoption of the Draft Act by the 
European Parliament, the Council of Ministers set up a 
working party of national officials to consider the 
question. It soon became evident that no decision could be 
reached if the unanimity principle required by Council 
decision-making was to be respected. The main stumbling 
block was still the PR principle. As a result, the Council 
decided to defer the adoption of a uniform electoral system 
until the 1989 elections.
The Political Affairs committee of the current European 




























































































office in 1984. The committee's revised Draft Act, dated 
March 22, 1985, was substantially similar to the 1982 draft. 
An opinion of the Legal Affairs committee was also attached 
to the new Draft Act. In this opinion, the Legal Affairs 
Committee expressed the view that if a single member 
constituency PR system (such as the one adopted for the 
Italian Senate) were not to be introduced "it would be 
necessary to retain the preference mechanism, in order to 
provide the explicit link between the will of the electorate 
and the choice of representatives to the European 
Parliament. This would be more difficult with blocked lists 
or if preference voting were abolished" (emphasis in 
or iginal).
As the next step in the decisional procedure was 
unfolding in the Council of Ministers, there seemed to be no 
question that a PR system would eventually be adopted and 
that the Italian Senate model did not enjoy the sympathies 
of most national governments. Preference voting mechanisms 
thus appeared to be the only technical device that would 
potentially permit the enforcement of individual 
accountability in a PR system and therefore favour the 
development of consensus in the working group of the Council 
of Ministers.
Unfortunately, the potential advantages of preference 




























































































London. To make matters worse, preference voting has 
recently had a bad press, mostly as a result of the current 
Italian debate on institutional reform, preference voting is 
depicted as one of the factors most favouring factionalism 
and clientelism in the Italian political system. This view 
has no doubt contributed to the growing consensus on the 
desirability of the elimination of preference voting in the 
Italian electoral system.
The striking feature of the Italian debate, which is 
being echoed at the European level, is the totally 
impressionistic nature of the arguments produced against 
preference voting. As the itinerary of the European 
electoral law harmonisation proposal is approaching its 
final and decisive stages, it is painfully clear that not 
enough is known, especially in comparative terms, about the 
political consequences of preference voting, one of the 
potential features that are most likely to favour the 




Recent research on preference voting, mostly based on 




























































































comparative findings, has produced the following conclusions 
(3):
1) on the possible negative effects of preference 
voting:
a) there seems to be no causal relationship between 
preference voting and party factionalism and/or 
cl-ientelism;
2) on the possible positive effects of preference 
voting:
b) preference voting seems to provide an incentive 
for voter mobilisation;
c) preference voting seems to permit the enforcement 
of individual accountability even in PR party- 
list systems.
Item c) implies a normative judgement on the subject of 
accountability. Some may have a preference for collective 
accountability to be enforced through the electorate's 
control over the party as a whole. It is considered here as 
a positive factor in the context of the debate on European 
electoral harmonisation.
It seems evident that if results such as these could be




























































































arguments against PR could be defeated by the adoption of 
preference voting. The purpose of this project is to study 
preference voting in comparative perspective, with 
particular reference to elections of the European 
Parliament.
Preference voting stricto sensu, that is allowing 
voters to cast a preference for candidates running on a 
party list, is already included in the European electoral 
legislation of Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands, 
whilst intra-party choice mechanisms also exist in Ireland 
(single transferrable vote), and Luxembourg (panachage). 
Although presenting very evident technical differences, all 
six electoral systems potentially allow individual 
accountability and proportional representation to coexist.
Whilst preference voting generally has no direct effect 
on the proportionality of representation (4), the degree of 
its effectiveness has a great impact on an electoral 
system's potential to enforce individual accountability. 
Only if an incumbent MEP has reason to fear for a possible 
withdrawal of personal support on the part of the 
electorate, especially at times of growing overall support 





























































































In practice, in a PR system with preference voting an 
incumbent could face the following outcomes:
a) reelection;
b) defeat due to his/her party's loss of electoral 
support (inter-partisan defeat);
c) defeat due to his/her own loss of personal
preference votes (intra-partisan defeat).
Whilst the first of these three possible outcomes is 
intuitively understood, we can distinguish between inter­
partisan and intra-partisan defeat as follows:
1) a defeated incumbent suffers an inter-partisan 
defeat if no new candidate in his/her party list 
is elected in his/her constituency; although 
preference voting may still play a crucial role in 
determining which incumbent is defeated, the 
defeat of some incumbent is dictated by the 
distribution of votes among the parties;
2) a defeated incumbent suffers an intra-partisan 
defeat if he/she is replaced by a new candidate 
from his/her party list in that constituency;
3) if fewer new candidates in a given list are




























































































constituency, those defeated incumbents who would 
have been elected had their parties not lost some 
seats, suffer an inter-partisan defeat, all the 
other defeated incumbents suffer an intra-partisan 
defeat.
The relative incidence of intra-partisan vis-à-vis inter­
partisan defeats gives a measure of preference voting 
effectiveness in a given system. Another measure of 
preference voting effectiveness is given by the ability of 
voters to alter the rank order of candidates as listed by 
the various parties. Both measures of preference voting 
effectiveness will be assessed in the course of analysis.
A fourth possible outcome, which is typical of rigid 
list PR systems, but one that can also occur in countries 
such as Belgium and the Netherlands where PV effectiveness 
thresholds are very high, is list order based intra-partisan 
defeat. Some incumbents are occasionally attributed list 
positions which are lower than some new candidates. Given 
the transfer of surplus votes down the list, such incumbents 
will be reelected only if their parties win enough seats to 
accommodate them, after the higher ranked new candidates 
have already been attributed seats. Otherwise they suffer 
an intra-partisan defeat. This type of defeat has very 
different implications from PV based intra-partisan defeats 




























































































Parties have a very good idea of how many seats they are 
likely to win and by placing incumbents lower on the list, 
they single-handedly determine their defeats.
The question of voter mobilisation is particularly 
relevant to the incidence of preference voting, and since in 
some systems (eg. the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg) the 
proportion -of voters choosing to cast preference votes as 
well as the relative numbers voting for each candidate 
contributes to determining the outcome, it is indirectly 
relevant to the effectiveness of preference voting as well. 
Are voters of notoriously disciplined parties more or less 
inclined to cast preference votes? Are voters of 
clientelistic or factionalised parties more likely to cast 
preference votes? Does personal competition among candidates 
for intra-party perference support lead to greater 
mobilisation of voters for their parties as well? Are 
especially prominent candidates, or candidates with ties to 
important interest groups able to attract exceptional 
numbers of preference votes? (And are they more able to 
deliver additional votes to their parties in systems with 
preference voting?) Although the data currently available 
allow only limited conclusions on most of these points, they 





























































































II. PREFERENCE VOTING INCIDENCE IN THE 1984 ELECTIONS OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Overall incidence in five countries
Analysis in this section will be limited to five of the 
countries considered in our study as all votes cast in Irish 
European Parliament elections are by definition preference 
votes for individual candidates. Table 1 reports the 
incidence of preference voting in European Parliament 
elections in the other five countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands). For three of these 
countries comparisons with the last general elections are 
offered. Percentages in Table 1 describe the proportion of 
preference votes actually cast by voters relatively to the 
number of preference votes that theoretically could have 
been cast. Such theoretical figures are obtained by 
multiplying the number of preference votes available to each 
voter (usually 1) by the number of voters. In most cases 
(with the exception of 4 out of 5 Italian constituencies, 
where voters were allowed to cast more than one preference 
vote), such percentages correspond to the number of voters 





























































































1?8T European Parlianent election; - Percentage; of po;;ible 
preference note; cast for political partie; bp country
Countries Uelgiu» Denmark Italy luxeibourg Netherlands
TP-Groups -
Parties 1984 1981 1284 Hi 1984 1983 1984 110 1984 1981
Communists r e s 25.« 28.4 5F 37.1 PCI 25.8 25.0 PC 24.4
KPB 31.1
Socialists P5 59.9 45.7 Soc.Den. 43.9 P5I 32.2 31.1 P051/ 29.4 Pvd.A t«.7 11.2
L5AP
5P 59.9 44.8 P5DI 33.2
tpf P5C 59.4 52.2 CD 90.0 DC 37.3 34.2 PCS/ 39.3 CDrt 11.3 8.3
CSU
CUP 43.8 59.4 SUP 35.4
ID KF 74.4
fumrean r n i 58.7 51.3 U 44.7 PRI/PII 29.4 PD/DP 44.2 UUD 25.9 5.«
liberals PUU 41.4 42.1
PR «51 37.8 24.4
RA THROW • IttO AOALiV 22.8 23.8 F8 « i .i DP • 14.7 Green/Red 30.2 35.3
12.8
9.2































































































Preference voting incidence varies considerably among 
parties and from country to country. In the 1984 elections 
the highest scores were registered for two Danish parties, 
the Center-democrats (CD) with 90% and the Conservatives 
(KE) with 74.4% respectively, whilst two Dutch parties had 
the lowest scores: the CDA (11.3%) and the PvdA (16.7%), the 
same score as the Italian DP. The peculiarities of the 
individual electoral laws, however, make comparisons across 
countries very difficult and misleading.
In the Netherlands, a simple party list vote is 
formally cast by voting for the first candidate on that 
party's list. Hence it is impossible to distinguish party 
votes from votes expressing on individual preference for the 
first candidate on the list. In this analysis only votes 
cast for candidates other that the head of the list have 
been counted as preference votes. This obviously makes Dutch 
preference voting incidence data not comparable with other 
countries' (5). Except in the Italian Islands constituency 
(see Table 4 for a breakdown of Italian constituencies), 
where voters were allowed to cast a single preference vote, 
Italian European Parliament election data is for the 
proportion of possible preference votes, not for the voters 
using the preference system (the same is true of all Italian 
national election data) (6). This obviously poses another 




























































































other similar problems discouraged the consideration of 
overall preference voting incidence figures by country.
The existence of certain common relationships can
however be observed by examining data at levels of
aggregation lower than country (i.e. party or, when
possible, constituency) and by comparing European Parliament 
elections to national elections. Table 1 offers comparisons 
between the 1984 European elections and the most recent 
general elections in three countries, Belgium, Italy and the 
Netherlands. Limiting our attention to those parties for 
which exactly comparable data is available, fifteen dyads 
comparing for the same parties preference voting incidence 
in European elections and national elections can be observed 
(8 in Belgium, 4 in Italy, and 3 in the Netherlands). Of 
these, 10 indicate higher preference voting incidence in 
European elections than in national elections, as opposed to 
only 2 dyads reflecting the existence of the inverse 
relationship. In 3 cases the difference was 1% or less and 
is to be considered insignificant.
Personality factors
Certainly single country factors can account at least 
partially for the greater incidence of preference voting in 
European elections than in national elections. In the 




























































































of political parties to give the first position to 
relatively unknown candidates in European elections, leading 
to a greater spread than in national elections of votes 
among other candidates (which, according to our 
operationalization, are then counted as effective preference 
votes). This is expecially illustrated by the case of 
E.H.T.M. Nijpels. Mr Nijpels was the leader of his party 
(WD) , but because he had no intention of serving in the 
European Parliament was nominated in last position on its 
list. Nonetheless, he obtained 102,500 preference votes, 
equal to 10.2% of the party's total vote and, as such, 
accounting for over half of the difference registered for 
the party between the 1982 Tweede Kamer election and the 
1984 election of the European Parliament.
Despite electoral law differences, "personality" 
factors seem to have an impact in Denmark, Italy and Belgium 
as well. The most outstanding case is probably represented 
by Erhard Jacobsen who obtained 88.4% of all preference 
votes cast for candidates from his party, the Danish CD, the 
party that obtained with 90% the highest preference voting 
incidence score! A number of other prominent Danish 
candidates, such as conservatives Paul Mpller and Claus 
Toksvig, and anti-EEC Else Hammerich also obtained very high 
scores. Such cases can find an explanation in the fact that 
constituencies in European elections are very large. As 




























































































Italy, the smaller number of candidates and lists to be 
distributed over the national territory in European 
elections (81 MEPs to be elected in 5 constituencies, as 
opposed to 630 deputies to be elected in 32 constituencies) 
allows greater concentration than usual of outstanding 
candidates, while at the same time permitting the 
presentation of such candidates even in areas that in 
national elections represent rather marginal constituencies, 
where secondary candidates are usually nominated. Although 
evidence of an importance of personalities in favouring 
higher preference voting incidence in European elections 
exists for most Italian parties, the most interesting case 
might be the one provided by the PCI in the Central 
constituency in 1979 (very similar figures were observed in 
1984). For the first time Communist voters in the "red" belt 
covering Tuscany, Umbria and the Marches, who normally are 
among the least enthusiastic users of preference votes, were 
able to vote for party secretary Enrico Berlinguer, who 
obtained a number of preference votes (more than 830.000) 
equal to 36.8% of his party's voters. One week earlier, in 
the national elections, PCI head of list candidates had 
averaged a number of preference votes equal to about 17% of 
PCI votes in the constituencies making up Central Italy, 
with a minimum of 6.3% in the Florence-Pistoia constituency, 
and a maximum of 24.7% and 32.2%, secured in Rome and Aquila 






























































































Finally, there are some indications that personality 
factors might contribute to explain preference voting 
incidence differentials between national elections and 
European elections in Belgium. The highest such
differentials were registered in 1984 for the PS in the 
Walloon constituency and for the SP in the Flemish 
constituency (about 14% and 13% respectively). In the 
Walloon constituency a non-incumbent independent candidate, 
J. Happart, a very well known personality, and a symbol of 
Walloon ethnicity obtained over half (about 235.000) of all 
preference votes cast for candidates on the PS list. Even 
more strikingly, in the Flemish constituency, K. Van Miert, 
party president and incumbent HEP, obtained over 84% of all 
preference votes cast for candidates on the SP list. 
Similarly to what has been observed about Italian PCI 
electors, a much greater number of Belgian Socialist
electors were offerred an opportunity to vote in European 
elections for at least one very prominent candidate and took 
advantage of such an opportunity. As could be expected, 
preference vote dispersion over the provinces making up the 
two constituencies was greatest for Happart and Van Miert of 
all PS and SP candidates respectively (8).
Geographical factors
This consideration introduces another possible 




























































































with single national or otherwise very large constituencies 
than in the national elections with a much higher number of 
constituencies (18 for the Netherlands, 30 for Belgium, 32 
for Italy). With very large or single national 
constituencies, regional loyalties can only be expressed 
through intra-party preferences, whereas with more numerous 
constituencies parties can cater to such loyalties through 
regional variations in their lists. Some evidence in support 
of this speculation is provided by the fact that candidates, 
as has been observed for the Netherlands, tend to obtain 
more preferences in the electoral subdistricts in which they 
live. The phenomenon seems to be most evident in districts 
including major cities and in the Southern province of 
Limburg (9). The local implantation of European 
Parliamentary candidates seems to be even more generalized 
in Belgium. Table 2 divides the 120 candidates of the 
parties that obtained seats in either 1979 or 1984, on the 
basis of the concentration or dispersion of the preference 





























































































Geographical concentration or dispersion of preference votes for candidates in 
the 1984 European Pariianient elections in Belgiu«, bp political party
PS PRL PSC FDF/CFE UU PW CUP 5P AGALEV ECOLO-U TOTAL
A: Dispersion 1 1 3 5 2 2 3 5 12 10 44
B: Concentration 








5 4 5 5 5 7 7 5 0 0 43
5ource: Gerard et al, op. cit. (our elaboration).
Candidates were included in row A if they received less than 505 of their preference votes in all provinces. They 
»ere included in ro« B if they obtained between 505 and 755 of their preferences in only one province and 
obtained 105 of their votes in respectively at least t»o lore provinces. They were included in row C if  they 




























































































Almost two thirds of the candidates (76 out of 120) 
obtained a majority of their preference votes in only one 
province, whilst over one third of these received the near 
totality of their preference votes in only one province. 
These results are even more striking if one excludes the two 
lists of ecologists (ECOLO-V and AGALEV). Support for 
candidates from these rather unconventional parties is 
fairly evenly distributed within the two constituencies and 
jointly they make up for more than half of the candidates in 
row 1. Limiting ourselves to the consideration of candidates 
on the eight more traditional lists, (representing almost 
90% of the electorate and having over 90% of the seats) we 
can see that over 75% of the candidates (74 out of 96) 
obtained a concentration of preference votes in only one 
province. Most notably of the 22 who did obtain a dispersion 
of preference votes over at least four provinces only 3 
obtained less than one third of their preferences in the 


























































































T A B L E  3
C o n c e n t r a t i o n  o r  d i s p e r s i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  v o t e s  f o r  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  
the 1984 European Parliament elections in Belgium bp
e l e c t o r a l  o u t c o m e *
E l e c t e d  a c c o r d i n g E l e c t e d  o u t  o f H o t e l e c t  e d
t o  l i s t  o r d e r l i s t  o r d e r
A 11 ( .9 ) 0 ( 0 ) 3 3 ( 1 3 )
B 1 0  ( 1 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 2 3 ( 2 1  )
C 2 ( 2 ) 1 ( 1 ) 4 0 ( 4 0  )
S o u r c e :  G e r a r d  e t  a l  , o p . c i t . . ( o u r  e l a b o r a t i o n ) .
F i g u r e s  i n  p a r e n t h e s i s  a r e  o b t a i n e d  bp  d e d u c t i n g  E C O L O - U  a n d  AGALEV'  




























































































Things look very different if one considers those 
candidates who were eventually elected in 1984. Although 10 
elected candidates obtained a concentration of preferences 
in one province with a sizeable penetration in other 
provinces, only three candidates who became MEPs had their 
personal following almost exclusively concentrated in one 
province. Almost half (11 out of 24), on the other hand, saw 
a dispersion of their preference votes over the five 
provinces.
As we shall see, preference voting effectiveness in 
Belgian elections is almost nil, and the type of 
implantation of candidates probably has very little to do 
with their degree of success in the actual election. But it 
may have an influence on the position they end up obtaining 
on their lists. The near totality of candidates eventually 
elected according to list order (21 out of 23) have some 
significant support in provinces other than their own. The 
preference votes of more than half of these (11/21) present 
a marked degree of dispersion over the five provinces. By 
contrast, proportions are very different for non elected 
candidates. If, again, we limit our attention to those 
parties that are more established in the Belgian political 
tradition, they are almost reversed, with more than half of 
non elected candidates (40/74) obtaining a significant 




























































































It is impossible to establish a causal link between the 
two phenomena. If it is quite acceptable that political 
parties may prefer to place high on their lists those 
candidates who are perceived to have a broad appeal 
constituency-wide, the opposite could also be true and some 
highly ranked candidates may receive a high number of 
preference votes partly because of their position. Previous 
research done in Italian national elections shows that 
priviliged positions on the party slate result in preference 
vote advantages which are certainly not due to particular 
regional loyalties.
Parties on the other hand may be very well aware of the 
importance of regional loyalties for the overall appeal of 
their lists. This could explain the inclusion, with 
positions below the number of the seats the party expects to 
win in that constituency, of candidates whose support is 
concentrated in a limited geographical area. Undecided 
electors might end up choosing a party solely on the grounds 
that a particularly appealing candidate is on that list, 
regardless of his/her position. A partial confirmation of 
this hypothesis is provided by the only deviant case in the 
1984 European Parliament election in Belgium. R. Nols, a 
national parliamentarian with a strong local constituency, 
was nominated as an independent on the PRL list. Like 
E.H.T.M. Nijpels he had no intention to serve in the 




























































































national and communal mandates), and his nomination in last 
position simply had the declared aim of attracting votes for 
the party list. He was indeed very successful, obtaining 
almost 93.000 preferences (17.2% of his party's total vote). 
A huge majority of these (82.8%) were concentrated in 
Brabant.
Party factions and joint lists
One fairly general observation that can be made on
Table 1 is that, with the possible exception of the
Netherlands, more preference votes tend to be cast for
parties of the Right and Center than for parties of the 
Left. This confirms the findings of research carried out in 
the past in Italian parliamentary elections. In particular, 
striking differences were observed between the behaviour of 
supporters of Italy's two largest parties, the DC and the 
PCI, with DC electors being much more inclined to cast 
preference votes than their PCI counterparts. This 
phenomenon was explained with two negatively perceived 
attributes of the DC: traditionalism (and its corollary, 
clientelism) and factionalism. No doubt the importance 
attributed to these two factors in determining the level of 
preference voting is at the roots of the arguments in favour 





























































































Preference voting, like DC predominance, has its 
deepest roots in the South and in the Islands, regions where 
the traditional culture and patronage phenomena are more 
diffused. Hence the inference that clientelistic practices 
may indeed be responsible for the higher incidence of 
preference voting in the South and most notably for the DC. 
The importance of clientelism in building up a strong 
personal following is also well known to students of Irish 
Dail elections. This view is, however, "most clearly 
challenged in European competitions by the enormous 
constituencies, and for the incumbent MEP the lack of 
clientelist or localist benefits from the distant European 
Assembly" (11). Similar considerations do not seem to apply 
to the Italian case since preference voting incidence was 
for the DC almost the same in the 1984 European Parliament 
elections (actually slightly higher) as in the previous 
national elections. What is more interesting, however, is 
that the primacy of DC preferences in the South and the 
Islands is missing in the 1984 European elections. Table 4 
shows that in the South, both the PSI and PSDI obtained 





























































































1984  Eu ro p ean  P a r l ia m e n t  e l e c t i o n s  and 1903  Cham ber o f  D e p u t ie s  e l e c t i o n s  
p e r c e n ta g e s  o f  p o s s i b l e  p re fe re n c e  v o t e s  c a s t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  
by c o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  I t a l y
NU ME C S ISLA N D S
EP 83 EP 83 EP 83 EP 83 EP 83
PC I 19.1 12.1 15 . 4 1 1 . 2 2 5 .2 17 . 4 4 6 . 4 3 7 .2 4 9 . 7 2 3 .4
P 5 I 21 .53 1 8 .3 1 9 . 5 1 3 .5 3 2 .3 2 8 .5 5 8 .6 51 .4 6 3 .6 4 6 . 3
P S D I 16 . 2 NA 15 . 7 NA 3 5 .6 NA 63.1 NA 7 4 . 4 NA
DC 2 6 . 9 2 3 .8 2 8 .9 2 2 .8 3 8 .8 3 5 .4 5 7 . 2 52.1 6 2 . 4 5 2 .3
P P I/ P L I 2 4 . 3 N A 2 2 . 6 NA 26.1 NA 51 .3 NA 7 3 .0 NA
M S I 19 . 7 11 . 4 31 .1 9 . 6 30 2 5 .6 5 6 .6 4 1 . 0 5 9 . 4 3 0 .7
DP 13. 0 NA 11 . 9 NA 16 . 3 Na 3 9 .9 NA 3 5 .6 NA




























































































In the Islands DC candidates were also less successful in 
eliciting personal electoral support them their counterparts 
running for the Radical party and for the PRI/PLI alliance. 
If the PSI and the PSDI have often been accused, like the 
DC, of keeping patron-client relationships with the 
electorate, the opposite has always been affirmed about the 
PRI and above all the Radical party. While it is probable 
that in the South and Islands the personalist aspects of 
political culture in general favour high preference vote 
rates, the fact that these phenomena are recorded for many 
political parties prevents the drawing of further 
consequences, particularly on the effects of clientelism, as 
had been done in the past for the DC.
As already pointed out, high preference voting 
incidence for the DC has been explained in other ways. The 
DC's crucial power position has never been challenged in 
post-war Italy for political and institutional reasons. It 
can thus be deduced that the real fight for power largely 
takes place within the DC itself. It has been argued 
elsewhere that preference based intraparty competitions are, 
in many respects, the functional equivalent of US primary 
elections. Similarly to what happens in American primaries 
contested among candidates whose party is dominant in that 
particular area, the crucial importance of the competition 
among DC candidates could "lead to greater voter interest 




























































































As a consequence of this, and given that the Italian 
electoral system allows voters to cast multiple preference 
votes, groups of DC candidates might tend to form alliances 
in which each candidate would encourage his own voters to 
support his allies, obviously expecting a return of the 
favour. In other words, such factions would perform in the 
intra-party election, determined by personal preferences, 
many of the functions performed by the parties themselves in 
the general election. The relationship between the existence 
of strong and clearly identifiable intra-party factions and 
high preference voting rates has always been substantiated 
by pointing out that whenever two or more parties presented 
joint lists in Italian national elections, preference voting 
sprang up and went down again in the first election after 
the demise of the alliance.
No doubt evidence of a relationship between higher 
preference voting incidence and the presence of joint lists 
seems be confirmed by at least one case in the 1984 
election. Table 1 shows overall increases for preference 
voting rates obtained by the Red-Green alliance and by the 
Protestant coalition in the 1984 European Parliament 
elections in the Netherlands compared to the previous 
national elections. In only one case, that of the PSP, 1982 
single party percentages were higher than 1984 coalition 
percentages. Even allowing for the general "Euro-election 




























































































parties in the two coalitions were registered with respect 
to the 1979 European elections as well), this phenomenon is 
still quite remarkable, especially considering that it 
concerns parties whose electors are not normally inclined to 
challenge party choices through the use of preference votes. 
Actually, one could also argue that voter "indiscipline" 
manifested with regard to multy-party list choices can be 
considered a sign of tight single party discipline. Our 
interest here, however, is not to assess the degree of voter 
discipline, but to analyze the effect of multi-party/faction 
lists on the incidence of preference voting. To such an 
extent we feel authorized to consider a rise in preference 
voting levels as a sign of "indiscipline".
Naturally voter "indiscipline" in the Netherlands has 
different implications and consequences than in Italy. Since 
preference votes are the sole determinants of who gets 
elected on a given list, individual parties and intra-party 
factions may have a real interest in eliciting individual 
preference votes. Some analysts would even say that the 
latter find the main reason for their existence precisely in 
the search for preference votes. But in the Netherlands the 
power of list order in determing the election of individual 
candidates is overwhelming. Voters know that, with very few 
exceptions (but in such cases elected candidates generally 
resign) their preference votes only have a symbolic value. 




























































































coalition, the only aim in 1984 was to reach the 4% 
threshold. A possible explanation for the sharp increase of 
preference votes in 1984 is that electors wanted their 
respective electoral weights to be known (13).
This still confirms the importance of the relationship 
between higher preference voting rates and the existence of 
factions (or-individual parties) within a list, but offers 
new suggestions as to the direction of causality within the 
relationship. Whereas, somewhat acritically, Italian 
analysts had always assumed that the existence of effective 
preference voting in the electoral system of that country 
was an important determinant of intra-party factionalism, 
the Dutch case rather seems to indicate that factionalized 
and joint lists, especially if charaterized by heterogeneous 
programmes and strategies, may be an important factor in 
explaining high preference voting incidence.
The existence of a causal link between higher 
preference rates and intra-party factionalism is further 
challenged by another case, paradoxically registered in the 
1984 European Parliament elections in Italy, when discordant 
figures were registered for the PRI/PLI joint list. Whilst 
in the South and Islands, as was expected on the basis of 
previous experience, slight increases in the rate of 
preference voting over the 1979 averages between the two 




























































































constituencies there were instead rather sharp decreases
(14) . This may partly be attribued to a general decrease in 
the use of preferences from 1979, in the light of which a 
non-increase for the joint list might even have been 
regarded as normal; but the size of the decrease (between 7 
and 8%) in the other three constituencies removes further 
credibility from the hypothesis of a preference vote 
necessarily associated with list-factionalism, be it party 
or faction related, and calls for other explanatory factors.
In the 1984 elections, the electoral agreement between 
the PRI and PLI was not simply dictated by electoral 
tactics, but it rested on a solid common programme which at 
the time was perceived as a first step towards the fusion of 
the two parties. Especially in the North, where the two 
parties have their historical roots, the agreement was 
especially clear and detailed even on which candidates 
should eventually be elected. Lists were in fact 
characterized by the absence of outstanding candidates 
beyond the number of seats the alliance expected to win
(15) . The lower number of preferences secured by the list 
than in similar cases might thus be due not only to the 
absence of candidates capable of attracting preference votes 
for their personalities, but also to the greater 
tranquillity of the more likely candidates for election, and 





























































































In the light of these observations, it seems that the 
relationship between intra-party factionalism and high 
preference vote rates may be enhanced by the inability or 
unwillingness on the part of parties (or factions) to handle 
intra-alliance (or intra-party) conflict otherwise than in 
elections, regardless of the symbolic (such as in the Dutch 
case) or concrete (like in Italy) nature of such conflicts. 
It therefore-comes to seem increasingly less acceptable to 
assert with certainty that preference voting per se is the 




























































































II. PREFERENCE VOTING EFFECTIVENESS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
ELECTIONS
Preference voting and personnel turnover
As already mentioned, one of the supposed prerogatives 
of intra-party preference voting is that of providing an 
instrument for the enforcement of individual accountability 
in multi-member constituency PR electoral systems. The 
enforcement of individual accountability in fact presupposes 
that the reelection of incumbent parliamentarians be 
determined, at least in part, by factors other than the 
overall success or lack of success of political parties. 
What is important is the ability of intra-party choice 
mechanisms to affect parliamentary turnover. Only if an 
incumbent MEP has to personally compete with the individual 
candidates for the favours of the electorate in order to be 
reelected, will he or she fell accountable to the elecorate 
itself and not to the party apparatus. Such a competition in 
PR list systems can only involve members of the same party.
Comparative research covering national parliamentary 
elections in 13 countries with electoral systems providing 
mechanisms for intra-party competition has shown that intra­
party defeats can represent a considerable share of 




























































































Malta even reaching 100%) (16). In particular, the study 
registered the existence of a positive relationship between 
the size of the constituencies into which the countries were 
divided up and the effectiveness of intra-party mechanisms. 
A possible explanation for such a finding is that larger 
constituencies generally mean differentiated geographical 
areas and social composition, wider numbers of contenders 
and the inability of factions and/or individual candidates 
to extend their own influence to the whole territory of the 
constituency. All these elements render the control of 
preferences harder and the election of particular candidates 
less certain.
If this finding should be confirmed, one could expect 
intra-party competition to be a rather important source of 
personnel turnover in the European Parliament. All of the 
elements which are thought to make reelection more difficult 
for incumbents contesting national elections in large 
constituencies are characteristic of European Parliament 
elections as well. The only exception might be the number of 
candidates competing for seats in a given constituency, 
which in a number of cases is lower than in the 
corresponding national elections. Table 5 illustrates the 
outcome of the 1984 European Parliament elections for 






























































































1984 elections of the European Parliament - Outcome for incumbents
Country Party Elected Defeated Not Candidate N
Inter-Part. List Order Pref. Uote
Bet giu» 54.2 8.3 37.5 24
5P 100.0 3
CUP 42.8 14.3 42.8 7
PUU 50.0 50.0 2
PSC 33.3 66.6 3
PS 75.0 25.0 4
UU 100.0 1
RU' • 50.0 50.0 2
Denmark 68.8 31.2 16
CD 100.0 1
FB 75.0 25.0 4
Progress. 100.0 1
KF 50.0 50.0 2
Siamut 100.0 1
5D 66.7 33.3 3
5P 100.0 1
U 66.7 33.3 3
Ireland 50.0 21.4 7.1 2 M 14
FF 50.0 25.0 25.0 4
FG 80.0 20.0 5
Lab. 33.3 66.7 3
Ind. 50.0 50.0 2
Italy 47.5 1.3 1.3 26.3 25.9 80*
DC 32.1 3.6 32.1 32.1 28
DP 100.0 1
MSI 100.0 4
PCI 60.0 12.0 28.0 25
PRI/PLI 80.0 20.0 20.0 5
P. RAD. 66.7 33.3 - 3
PSDI 25.0 50.0 25.0 4
P5I 30.0 70.0 10.0 10
SUP 100.0 1




Netherlands 56.0 4.0 16.0 24.0 25
CDA 60.0 20.0 20.0 10
D '66 50.0 50.0 2
Pvdft 66.7 22.2 11.1 9
UUD 50.0 50.0 4
EP Percentages 50.6 4.2 6.0 13.3 25.9 166
Numbers 84 7 10 22 43 »
* Percentages add up to more than 100% because one candidate, Ms Hacciocchi was counted both as 
a Radical (not candidate) and as a Socialist (Intra-partisan defeat).




























































































Only slightly over one half of them (50.6%) were 
reelected for a second term, but the relatively high 
turnover of personnel was only to a limited extent due to 
defeats of incumbents (electorally induced turnover). Over 
one quarter of them (25.9%) chose not to run again for 
election, which lowers electorally induced turnover in the 
six countries to a total of 23.5%. A more detailed analysis 
of these data requires some considerations on political 
parties' electoral strategies. Political parties are 
usually believed to have great control over the election of 
candidates on their lists. The most powerful tool in the 
hands of party organizations is of course nomination, or 
renomination in the case of incumbents. Other important 
factors of party control are the attribution of a more or 
less "safe" district, or, in most of the countries covered 
in this study, of a high or low position on the party slate. 
List position is believed to be an important determinant of 
election even in countries with "loose" party lists like 
Italy or Denmark. A high list position reflects the 
personal stature of the candidate and the endorsement of the 
party, which can make the candidate appealing even to the 
uninformed voter. Such an advantage for highly ranked 
candidates can be supplemented with specific voting 
instructions handed down to the rank and file. Although a 
number of new candidates is nominated at each election with 





























































































Party organisations may be motivated by essentially two 
concerns when renominating outgoing MEP's . The first motive, 
is the obvious one, that the HEP did his job well and the 
party wants him to carry on. In this case the party will do 
everything possible to make sure the candidate will be 
elected (good list position, safe district). Given the 
number of incumbents (in this case about one quarter) who 
are not put-up for reelection, parties theoretically have a 
sufficiently safe cushion to ensure the election of such a 
category of incumbents. In theory, these incumbents should 
indeed be elected, even though in cases of particularly 
severe setbacks of their parties, some of them might be 
expected to suffer inter-partisan defeats. Incumbents who do 
not wish, or are not considered fit, to be reelected can 
still be renominated for their personal appeal and their 
potential ability to attract votes for the party-list. 
Incumbents renominated on the basis of this second motive 
are usually not placed in list positions that might 
facilitate their reelection (in some cases they are placed 
at the very bottom of the list, where they are more likely 
to catch the elector's eye but most unlikely to be 
reelected) and are expected to suffer list order based 
intra-partisan defeats (17). Since this second category of 
incumbents is rather small, one could expect that most 
incumbents running for reelection would indeed be successful 
and that a small number of them would suffer inter-partisan 




























































































would constitute a measure of preference voting 
effectiveness.
The data shows that inter-partisan and list order 
induced intra-partisan defeats are not very numerous indeed. 
In particular, all renominated Danish incumbents were 
elected in 1984, suggesting the existence in that country of 
a particularly well developed ability of political parties 
to protect their incumbents. Inter-partisan defeats were 
suffered by only 7 incumbents EP-wide, with no single party 
suffering more than one such defeats. In four cases (RW in 
Belgium, D '66 in the Netherlands, Labour in Ireland, PSDI 
in the third Italian constituency) they were the result of a 
total loss of representation for the parties concerned. This 
type of electoral outcome was of some significance only in 
Ireland, with 21.4% (3 out of 14) members of the first
European Parliament failing to win seats for their parties. 
The higher incidence of inter-partisan defeats in Ireland 
can be attributed to the difficulties parties and candidates 
have in controlling second and third preferences. A number 
of unpredictable defeats (especially those suffered by 
Labour) can be indeed imputed to candidates' failures to 
attract adequate numbers of transfers (18). The phenomenon 
is indeed much more limited, or non-existant, like in 
Denmark, in countries adopting list PR systems (8.3% in 




























































































The case of Luxembourg is an exception in that 5 of its 
6 incumbents were defeated due to list-order intra-partisan 
defeats. Luxembourgeois incumbents account for exactly half 
of such defeats registered in the six countries concerned. 
As already mentioned in an earlier footnote, European 
Parliament elections in Luxembourg tend to be dominated to 
an even greater extent than in other countries by domestic 
policy considerations. This is reflected by the more 
priviliged list positions attributed to prominent national 
leaders over outgoing MEPs, who are listed alphabetically
with the rest of the candidates. Given the situation.
Socialist MEP Vic Abens' success over his party leader
Jacques F., Poos (who was also elected) can be considered to
be a remarkable feat. List order intra-party defeats are 
present to any significant extent in only one other country, 
the Netherlands, where they account for the near totality 
(16% out of 20% incumbents defeated in 1984) of electorally 
induced turnover. Even in this case, though, such defeats 
should not have come as surprises to the headquarters of the 
parties involved (CDA and PvdA) as the number of seats they 
eventually won was equal to or higher than the number of 
renominated incumbents.
As we had already anticipated, inter-party and list 
order intra-party defeats are fairly minor factors of 
personnel turnover in the European Parliament and certainly 




























































































political parties’ abilities to ensure the reelection of 
their incumbents. As a result of this, preference vote 
related intra-partisan defeats emerge as the only effective 
instrument in the hands of electors to affect personnel 
turnover in the European Parliament and to potentially 
enforce individual accountability, preference voting intra­
partisan defeats account for over one half of all 
electorally -induced turnover (13.3% out of 23.5%). Even 
more interestingly, they represent the single most important 
source of turnover in Italy where they concerned a number of 
incumbents higher than those who chose, or were forced, not 
to run for reelection. Only one other outgoing MEP, in 
Ireland, lost his seat due to an intra-partisan defeat. In 
Italy preference votes are the sole determinant of the order 
in which candidates are attributed seats won in the 
constituency by the list as a whole. Even if most incumbents 
are given high positions on their party lists (the exception 
is represented by PCI lists where most incumbents are listed 
alphabetically with the other candidates), they still have 
to secure a higher number of preference votes than the other 
candidates on that list, in order to be reelected. Parties' 
electoral strategies, organizational strength and internal 
dynamics have a great importance in explaining the huge 
differences in the incidence of PV intra-partisan defeats 




























































































Party differences aside, reelection is obviously much 
more difficult to achieve in Italy than in Denmark, a 
country where preference votes are also an important 
determinant of the election of individual candidates (19). 
Preference votes are as important in Luxembourg and indeed 
they determined the defeat of 5 incumbents out of 6, but we 
have seen how such defeats had already been sanctioned by 
the order in-which candidates had been presented. A number 
of factors might contribute to explaining the difference 
between Italy and Denmark. Constituency size can definitely 
be such a factor. Even the smallest Italian constituency, 
the Islands, had almost twice as many valid votes as the 
whole country of Denmark, even if it was only to be 
represented by half as many candidates. Each party in 
Denmark did not have more than 3 incumbents to "protect". 
The PCI and the DC had up to six incumbents up for 
reelection in some constituencies. The option given to 
Italian electors to cast up to three preference votes in the 
four larger constituencies certainly contributed to making 
party control of preference votes more difficult and 
consequently the effectiveness of preference votes greater. 
Another factor might be party discipline. As we have already 
pointed out, parties boasting a tight control and discipline 
over their rank and file usually manage to control very well 
the effectiveness of preference voting. Danish parties are 




























































































their Italian counterparts, and may be better able to 
influence their electors' individual choices.
Danish parties certainly are the most inclined to give 
their incumbents full support. Denmark was in fact the only 
country in which all incumbents were attributed exclusively 
top of the list positions. This might be another 
contributing- factor in explaining the above mentioned 
differences with Italy and Luxembourg. Most Italian major 
parties ranked a number of new candidates higher than some 
incumbents. The same happened in Luxembourg. This practice 
may be of little consequence for the PCI, whose lists are 
mostly alphabetical, but might be a contributing factor for 
the high number of intra-partisan defeats suffered by 
Italian DC incumbents.
Incumbency, at any rate, is a very powerful asset and a 
majority of candidates who possess it and decide to stand 
for re-election are indeed successful. Although sex has 
always been considered a very important factor, and men have 
always been perceived as more likely to have a long-lasting 
parliamentary career, our data show that such an advantage 
does not seem to exist for candidates who have already 





























































































Outcome by sex for incumbents 1984 I
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Elected Inter­ List Preference Nati onal N
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15 . 4 13
1 0 0 . 0  1
Italy 47.1 
50.0






Luxembourg M 25.0 75.0 4
F 100.0 2
Nether 1ands M 50.0 5.0 15.0 30.0 20




























































































According to Table 6, women seem to be slightly more likely 
to run for reelection, which may be indicative of a relative 
scarcity of suitable female candidates, and seem to fare 
roughly as well as their male colleagues. The most 
interesting finding in this table is that women were more 
likely to suffer preference vote based intra-partisan 
defeats in Italy. This datum, to be taken with great 
caution given the small number involved, suggests in 
contrast with findings in the Netherlands and Denmark that 
women tend to receive more preference votes than men, 
especially as a consequence of the efforts of female 
organizations (20). Social and cultural differences aside, 
such a contrast might be explained by the different 
intrinsic value of preference votes in the Netherlands and 
for some Danish lists, where they are often used as protests 
or testimonials, and in Italy where they actually determine 
election. Such an hypothesis, however, requires further 
testing.
List order and preference voting
Table 7 lists by country and party four numbers: (a) 
The number of preference votes received by the least popular 
winning candidate; (b) The number of preference votes 
received by the most popular losing candidate; (c) The list 
position of the lowest ranked winning candidate (where two 




























































































who was elected but immediately opted out); (d) the list 
position of the highest ranked losing candidate. If list 
order strictly determined election, (c) should be one bigger 
than (d). If preference vote strictly determined election, 
(a) should always be bigger than (b). In this latter case 
an extra word of caution appears to be necessary. Not only 
should (a) be bigger than (b), they should also be 
relatively close to one another, otherwise one could argue 
that the party had simply nominated as many outstanding 
candidates as the seats it expected to win in that 
constituency.
List order, as could be expected, does strictly 
determine election in Belgium; and the Netherlands. The two 
exceptions being the two candidates, Nols, for the PRL in 
Belgium, and Nijpels, for the W D  in the Netherlands, who 
were elected despite very unfavourable list positions, but 
immediately opted out. In 4 cases out of 9 observed in 
Belgium and in 3 out of 5 observed in the Netherlands the 
least popular winning candidates obtained fewer preference





























































































Pref erenee votes and rank order positions for lowest placed winners and
hi ghest placed losers in the 1994 European Parliament elections
Countries Party N Const. Win Lose Win L.<
Bel giurn BSP 13 2394 9562 4 1
CUP 13 45296 90900 4 r
PUU 13 13969 20119 2
PPL 11 40529 39022 11/2
PSC 11 35439 32450 2
PSB 11 19651 23213 5
uu 13 44524 4461 0 2
ECOLO-U 1 1 1 7504 9507 1
ACALFU 13 23126 6339 1 :
Denmark CD 10 116664 637 1
EB 20 1 6733 7741 13
KF 20 721 1 5526 4
5 20 15619 9659 5
SF 20 42345 5430 1
U 19 20923 1 9709 2
1 tal y DC 22 1 137946 134739 19
14 2 115317 101211 14
1« 3 91559 69540 16
19 4 152591 144463 15
9 3 69010 50121 3
MSI 16 3 119905 76143 1
19 4 106533 56533 2
9 5 99009 39789 1
PCI 22 1 47792 47300 21
15 2 48509 27667 15
16 3 42542 1 9269 16
19 4 153579 127997 19
9 5 139902 34103 2
PLI/PRI 22 1 151290 99243 3
15 2 59216 4751 3 1
16 3 52213 31591 1
19 4 70604 32760 1
PSI 22 1 90699 64097 3
15 2 75397 56421 3
16 3 70926 40325 2
19 4 174450 140095 3
9 5 140453 37102 1
Luxembourg PCS 12 15761 12910 12
PD 12 22239 1 3399 1
POSL 12 13411 11215 2
Wether 1 and'; CDA 40 4607 16354 1
Pvd. A 37 3194 10917 9
UUD 40 9543 5767 40/5
Green/Red 40 1 0237 3047 2




























































































On the other hand, preference voting was always the
decisive factor in Italy, Denmark and Luxembourg. In at
least 1 case in Denmark and in 3 cases in Italy the
difference between (a) and (b) was less than 10% indicating 
that at least in some cases intra-partisan competition can 
be very tight. Denmark and Italy, despite very similar 
electoral systems, had displayed very different levels of 
preference voting effectiveness with respect to European 
Parliamentary personnel turnover. Much closer levels of 
preference voting effectiveness can be observed by looking 
at a different indicator. Whilst in 50% of Italian lists at 
least one candidate was elected, owing to preference voting, 
at the expense of a higher ranked candidate, the same 
occurrence was observed for one third of Danish lists. This 
finding, however, can do nothing more than confirm the 
observation that preference voting is a powerful tool in the 
hands of electors only to the extent that the organizational 
strength of political parties and their control over the 
electorate permits.
Table 8 offers a synthetis of some of the information 
that has been analyzed so far. Row 1 consists of five 
scores, one for each country considered, representing the 
correlations between incumbency and list position. As was 
argued earlier, renominated MEPs should to a very large 
extent be given high positions on their party lists. 
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T A B L E  8
I n c u m b e n c y ,  l i s t  p o s i t i o n  a n d  o u t c o m e  i n  t h e  1 9 8 4  e l e c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  -  C o r r e l a t i o n  s c o r e s
B e l g i u m  D e n m a r k  I t a l y  L u x e m b o u r g  N e t h e r l a n d s
1 )  I n c u m b e n c y  a n d  l i s t  . 9 3  1 . 0 0  .66
p o s i  t i  o n
.96
. 97.7 ) L i s t  p o s i t i o n  a n d  
e l e c t o r a l  o u t c o m e




























































































discussed at length, the fairly high, positive, scores in 
row 1 seem to indicate that indeed most incumbents are 
granted privileged list positions. The Italian score, 
relatively low if compared to the other three countries, can 
be explained with the two opposite strategies adopted by the 
two major parties. The DC placed in privileged positions a 
number of prominent new candidates which was higher than the 
number of seats the party could realistically expect to win. 
This was possibly resulting from an inability of the party 
to reach a compromise that would be acceptable to all of its 
factions. The PCI, on the other hand, ran largely 
alphabetical lists, thus placing near the bottom a number of 
incumbents. The party was obviously relying on the 
efficiency of its electoral apparatus and on its ability to 
steer in the desired direction sufficiently large numbers of 
preference votes.
The results in row 2 are somewhat more surprising, even 
if at first sight they look very similar to those in row 1. 
No significant difference among the 5 countries was to be 
expected for the latter batch of results, since no matter 
what electoral system a country adopts, all parties should 
have an interest in emphasizing the candidacies of the 
incumbents they renominate. Some difference could be 
expected, on the other hand, with respect to the correlation 
between list position and electoral outcome. Highly placed 




























































































totally rigid nature of lists adopted in those countries, 
should be elected, whereas all bottom candidates should be 
defeated. Correlation scores should thus be perfect 1.00s. 
This is in fact very closely reflected in our data. Both 
Belgium's (.93) and the Netherlands' (.92) scores are almost 
perfect. They would be, if not for one candidate in each 
country placed at the bottom of the list who was elected and 
immediately opted out.
By the same token, one would expect that theoretically 
loose list systems would produce less than perfect, albeit 
positive, scores in Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg. These 
expectations are matched by Italy's .65 and Luxembourg's 
.69. Denmark's score, on the other hand, -is in the same 
league as Belgium's and the Netherlands; missing perfection 
because of one single candidate who was elected out of list 
order. This finding seems to confirm the importance of party 
characteristics and strategies in determining the 
effectiveness of preference voting even in loose list 
systems.
Further proof of this can be found by looking at 
different party scores in those countries where overall 
correlation scores were rather low. Table 9 shows that even 
within the same country political parties may have radically 




























































































T A B L E  9
I n c u m b e n c y ,  l i s t  p o s i t i o n  a n d  o u t c o m e  i n  t h e  1 9 8 4  e l e c t i o n s  
o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  I t a l y  a n d  L u x e m b o u r g  -  
C o r r e l a t i o n  s c o r e s  b y  p a r t y
I t a l y DC M S I P C I P L I / P R I P S D  I P S  I
t )  I n c u m b e n c y  a n d .66 1 . 0 0 . 21 .96 . 9 4 . 8 7
l i s t  p o s i t i o n
2 )  L i s t  p o s i t i o n . 4 4 1 . 0 0 . 5 7 . 9 5 . 9 5 . 96
a n d  e l e c t o r a l  
o u t c o m e
L u x e m b o u r g  P C S  .  P D  POST.
1 )  I n c u m b e n c y  a n d  . 2 3  0 . 0 0  . 8 2
l i s t  p o s i t i o n
2 )  L i s t  p o s i t i o n  . 3 3  
a n d  e l e c t o r a l  
o u t c o m e




























































































Particularly dramatic on this point are the differences 
between the PD and the POSL in Luxembourg and between the 
PCI and most other parties in Italy. On the other hand, in 
the two countries list position and electoral outcome 
correlation scores are very high, sometimes even perfect, 
for six parties out of nine. Besides the DC and PCI, whose 
strategies and relationships with the electorate have 
already been discussed, the PCS is the only other party 
whose list order seems to have been upset by preference 
votes.
The Danish/Italian system vs. the Belqian/Dutch system: a 
simulation on preference voting effectiveness
As we have seen, preference voting effectiveness can be 
not only a function of the electoral system adopted in a 
given country but also a function of certain political, 
social and cultural characteristics of that country. 
Although it is very difficult to assess the importance and 
the effects of the latter, some light can be shed on at 
least some of the effects of the former, which remain the 
essential focus of this study.
Table 10 simulates the effects of the two major 
preference voting models presently adopted in the elections 




























































































T A B L E  10
T h e  1 9 E ! 4  E l e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  -  A  s i m u l a t i o n  o f  s e a t  
a  1 I o t a  t: i o n  u n d e r  d i f f e r e n t  e l e c t o r a l  s y s t e m s
B e l  g  i  uni T O T A L S P C U P P U U P R L P S C P S U LI E C O L O A GAL
A 2 4 4 4 2 3 2 5 2  1 1
B 2 0 4 3 1 3 2 4 1 1 1
C 2 4 4 4 2 3 2 5 2  1 1
D e  n  n i a  r  k T 0  T A L C D F B C P N S O S P U
A 1 5 1 4 4 3 1 2
B 1 5 1 4 4 3 1 2
C 1 3 1 3 4 2 1 2
I t a l y T O T A L D C M S I P C I P S  I
( I  s  1 a n  d s  )
A 7 3 1 2 1
B 7 3 1 2 1
C 7 3 1 2 1
L  u x e m b o u r g T O T A L P C S P D P O S l .
A 6 3 1 2
B 6 3 1 2
C 5 2 1 2
N e  t  Ii e r  1 a n  d s T O T A L C O  A P u d  A U U O G R E E N P  r o t .
A 2  5 8 9 5 2 1
B 1 ? 4 6 5 1 1





























































































actually elected by each party in each country in the 1984 
elections. Row B is the number of those candidates who would 
have been elected under the Italian/Danish (only explicitly 
cast preference votes count) system. Row C is the number of 
those candidates who would have been elected under the 
Belgian/Dutch (party votes transfer straight down the list) 
system. Italian data is limited to the only constituency 
(the Islands) where only one preference vote is allowed, the 
other, multiple preference, constituencies not being 
comparable to the other four countries. Obviously rows A and 
C are by definition the same for Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The same applies to rows A and B for Denmark, 
Italy and Luxembourg.
Given the limits imposed by our need for data 
comparability, Italian data does not yield any interesting 
results, as all the MEPs who were actually elected in 1984 
in the Islands would have been elected under the 
Belgian/Dutch system as well. We know, of course, that 
significant differences are to be expected only in large 
enough constituencies. In fact, the effects of the adoption 
of a semi-rigid system would have been rather limited also 
in Luxembourg, where they would have affected one PCS MEP, 
and in Denmark, where one FB and one SD MEPs would not have 





























































































The potential effects of the adoption of the 
Italian/Danish system in the Netherlands and Belgium are 
much more evident and as such, they permit more interesting 
considerations. A total of 10 MEPs (that is over 20% of all 
HEPs elected in the two countries) were elected because of 
transfers of surplus votes from above, and would have failed 
under the Italian/Danish system. Whilst the 4 Belgian cases 
are very evenly distributed (one for each of four parties), 
the 6 Dutch cases are mostly concentrated on the two major 
parties (3 PvdA, 2 CDA, 1 Green/Red Alliance). If a loose 
list system should actually be adopted in the Netherlands, 
it is quite possible that preference votes would be 
redistributed in such a way as to minimize the effects of 
the change. It is still very interesting to note, however, 
that large parties, structurally forced to appeal to a more 
heterogeneous electorate, are the ones that would be more 
likely to have a hard time in coping with the new situation. 
It is quite possible, therefore, that most of the effects 
produced by our simulation would indeed happen in reality.
This simulation thus seems to indicate that conditions 
for significant preference voting effectiveness may exist, 
once a suitable electoral system is adopted, in countries 
other than Italy and that the high degree of preference 






























































































IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The preceeding analysis allows for the drawing of some 
generalizations on the subjects of voter mobilization, 
geographical representation and individual MEP 
accountability. On the basis of these general findings some 
inferences are possible on the potential consequences of the 
projected adoption of preference voting mechanisms in future 
elections of the European Parliament.
The use of preference voting, or preference voting 
incidence, as it has been defined in this study, seems to be 
connected with a political culture to a large extent imbued 
with personalist elements. But the high mumber of personal 
votes received by prominent personalities in Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands is certainly 
a result of a trend towards an increasing encroachment of 
the media, television above all, upon the political process. 
Such a trend, even if begun in a country, the USA, where 
individual personalities dominate the political scene, has 
now spread to many Western European countries, even if 
strongly characterized by party politics. It is arguable, 
even if empirical evidence to this effect is difficult to 
obtain, that wherever voters are offered the opportunity to 




























































































politicians they may see it as an incentive to participate 
in elections.
The adoption of preference voting in the framework of a 
unified system for the election of the European Parliament, 
would probably have some effects in the three countries 
adopting rigid list preference voting systems, France, 
Germany and -Greece. The awareness that the opportunity 
offered to the electorate to actually cast a vote for a 
prominent personality could have an effect on the
mobilization of the electorate, would most likely have an 
effect on party nomination strategies. Although it is 
doubtful whether voter turnout would significantly increase 
(an educated guess is no more than 1 or 2 percentage points) 
as an immediate consequence of the inclusion of more 
prominent candidates in party lists, such an occurrence 
might in the long run contribute to the spreading of the 
conviction that the European Parliament is an important 
institution and consequently that EC politics is important. 
If these two combined effects can be seen as positive and 
perhaps auspicable developments, a number of measures would 
have to be adopted to avoid the distortions that can already 
be observed in some countries and that would no doubt spread 





























































































The trend towards the nomination of prominent national 
leaders who are eventually elected only to opt out 
immediately after election has already reached pathological 
proportions in Luxembourg and has been harshly criticized in 
the Netherlands and Belgium as well. Besides undermining the 
process of formation of a genuinely European political class 
this would reinforce the feeling that European elections are 
nothing more than a sounding board for domestic politics 
which national leaders can use at the time of maximum public 
attention and dispose of immediately after. These negative 
effects can only be avoided through the adoption of very 
rigid incompatibility clauses, such as an obligation to 
resign from previously held positions in case of election to 
the EP. Similar considerations, but with different 
implications, can be made about the Italian strategy, 
inherited from national parliamentary elections, to nominate 
the same prominent leaders in several different 
constituencies. The actual, final, constituency of the 
candidate is decided only after election, depending on the 
outcome(s) of the election. This blurs the meaning of 
geographical representation, and allows multiple winners, or 
their parties, to decide, independently of voters' wishes, 
which runner ups will eventually sit in Parliament. Again, 





























































































The hypothesis has been put forth that the problem of 
geographical representation could also be eased with the 
adoption of preference voting mechanisms. The argument is 
that even in the presence of national or very large 
constituencies (like the Irish and Italian ones) voters 
could always discriminate in favour of their local 
candidates by giving them their preference votes. As we have 
seen, Belgian evidence confirms that most candidates receive 
an overwhelming percentage of their preferences in one 
specific province. This, incidentally, justifies the 
inference that an apt geographical distribution of 
candidacies might constitute another incentive for voter 
mobilization. But, even if the opportunity to cast 
preference votes for local candidates might be very 
gratifying for many local community minded voters or members 
of minorities, they will only receive actual representation 
if their candidates are elected. Unfortunately for them, our 
data indicates that election seems to require voter appeal 
well beyond the borders of one single province. This finding 
of course is limited by the fact that preference data at 
levels of aggregation lower than constituency was only 
available for Belgium, where election is determined by party 
choices, resulting in the selection of candidates with broad 
appeal. This consideration, however, still does not remove 
the fact that there is no evidence that preference voting 
might allow for some degree of minority or geographical 




























































































constituency PR system, such as the one used for the 
election of the Italian Senate might be more suitable for 
that purpose.
One other important point that was instead confirmed in 
the course of the analysis of the incidence of preference 
voting is that preferential mechanisms are not the cause of 
party factionalism. The fact however remains that preference 
voting incidence for loosely organized and highly 
factionalized parties tends to remain higher than for highly 
organized parties. In fact, a number of parties seem to be 
able to maintain an extraordinary degree of control over the 
preferences cast by their electors. This suggests that the 
extention of the use of preference voting to other 
countries, where parties are used to keeping a strict 
control over who gets elected on their lists, might induce a 
tightening of party organizations, thus indeed reducing the 
danger of party factionalization.
The desirability of tighter organizations and of 
structures designed to facilitate internal comprimise is 
made all the more urgent for parties contesting European 
elections by the fact that preference voting effectiveness 
is greatly increased by the size of constituencies, which in 
European Parliament elections are bound to be very large. In 
the 1984 election inter-partisan defeats were very few and 




























































































by political parties. This obviously made outgoing MEPs 
virtually unaccountable to their electors, in open contrast 
with the principle of individual accountability. Intra­
partisan defeats (which are determined by preference votes) 
were the only significant source of electorally induced 
European Parliament personnel turnover, making Italy, where 
most such defeats occurred the only country where individual 
MEP accountability is potentially enforced. As we have seen, 
the effectiveness, as well as the incidence, of preference 
voting can be counteracted by political parties through the 
elimination of internal disputes, through the creation of 
efficient electoral machineries, and through the keeping of 
better links with the electorate. This in itself would be a 
desirable consequence of the adoption of preference voting 
mechanisms. But the level of organizational efficiency 
required to attain total preference voting control are very 
difficult to achieve for many political parties. Intra­
partisan defeats would consequently and in all likelihood 
constitute the most significant source of personnel 
turnover, making renominated incumbents effectively and 
individually accountable to the voters. Effective preference 
voting thus potentially representes an important
prerequisite for the respect of an important principle,
individual accountability which is at the basis of the
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(the DC and the PCI), the discrepancy between the two 
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